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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 4304

AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USMISSION UN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

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CINCUSAFE PRIORITY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4082

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CY, TU, GR, NATO

SUBJ: CYPRUS COUP: MISSION SOUNDINGS AMONG ALLIES

BEGIN SUMMARY: HERewith A COMPENDIUM OF RANDOM SOUNDINGS DURING PAST 24 HOURS AMONG ALLIED OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING GREEK/TURKISH/CYPRUS EVENTS DURING THE PAST DOZEN DAYS. SOME OF THESE OPINIONS ARE OF INTEREST THEMSELVES, OTHERS ONLY BECAUSE THEY REVEAL THINKING OF CERTAIN ALLIED DELEGATION REPRESENTATIVES. OPIONS REFLECTED COME FROM HIGH AND MEDIUM LEVEL UK, FRG, GREEK, TURKISH, BELGIAN, CANADIAN, DANISH AND CONFIDENTIAL

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LUXEMBOURG DELEGATION OFFICIALS, AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE IS/IMS. END SUMMARY.

1. VIEWS OF PRESENT SITUATION: UK FEELS THAT ADVENT OF KARA-

MANLIS GOVERNMENT REMOVES TWO IMMINENT DANGERS: A TURKISH ATTACK IN THRACE AND A GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO. IT WOULD BE A DISASTER IF THE TURKS SEIZED NICOSIA AIRPORT, AS GREEK REACTION TO THIS MOVE WOULD SHARPLY NARROW KARAMANLIS' OPTIONS, ONE BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID. AS OF EVENING OF JULY 24, GREEK DELEGATION, WHILE NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY OF NEW FLARE-UP OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN CYPRUS, FEELS MUCH MORE RELAXED BECAUSE MORNING OF JULY 24 PASSED WITHOUT FEARED ASSAULT BY THE TURKS ON THE AIRPORT. A GERMAN OFFICIAL FEELS THAT THE U.S. CAN NOW EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE TURKS TO ABIDE BY THE CEASE-FIRE SINCE TURKEY DEPENDS ON U.S. FOR MILITARY AID, BUT, HE WARNS, TOO MUCH PRESSURE MIGHT DRIVE TURKEY INTO SOME SORT OF CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

2. UK CONSIDERS KARAMANLIS TO A VERY GOOD MAN. ALTHOUGH, LIKE MOST GREEKS, HE WOULD PREFER ENOSIS, HE HAS PROVEN HIMSELF REALISTIC ON THIS SUBJECT. UK THINKS KARAMANLIS IS RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT OF THE GREEK MILITARY AND UK HAS A CERTAIN CONFIDENCE IN JUDGMENTS OF FRIENDS OF KARAMANLIS THAT HE WOULD NEVER TAKE A POSITION IN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IF THERE WERE STRINGS ATTACHED. A GREEK DIPLOMAT EXPECTS BOTH KARAMANLIS AND FOTINIS MAVROS TO BE STRONG SUPPORTERS OF GREEK PARTICIPATION IN NATO. A UK OFFICIAL SAID HIS GOVERNMENT IS HIGH ON CLERIDES WHO OBVIOUSLY ALSO HAS APPROVAL OF THE CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD HMG HAS STILL NOT COME TO ANY CONCLUSION ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF MAKARIOS.

3. BRITISH OFFICIALS FEEL THAT CHANCES FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED BECAUSE THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL LIKELY BE MORE REASONABLE ON THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS THAN THE MILITARY JUNTA WOULD HAVE BEEN. A UK OFFICIAL VENTURED THE OPINION THAT HE DOUBTS THE TURKS WANT PARTITION OF CYPRUS AS THAT WOULD BRING GREEK TERRITORY AND AIRFIELDS NEAR TURKEY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. FURTHERMORE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PARTITION COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEM OF MANY SMALL TURKISH ENCLAVES ON THE ISLAND. THIS OFFICIAL THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT ONE THING THE TURKS MIGHT WANT IS BASIS ON THE ISLAND SIMILAR TO CONFIDENTIAL

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THE BRITISH SBA'S TO HELP GUARANTEE TURKISH RIGHTS. A TURKISH DIPLOMAT WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE ADVENT OF THE KARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT SAYING ANKARA HAD BEEN TOTALLY FRUSTRATED OVER POSSIBILITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH FORMER GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THEY HAD FOUND OUT SEVERAL TIMES THAT TOP GREEK OFFICIALS HAD TITLES ONLY WITH NO AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER TO ACCOMPANY.

4. VIEWS OF THE FUTURE: MANY OFFICIALS TALKED TO AGREED THAT ATTENTION MUST NOW BE TURNED TO HEALING ALLIANCE WOUNDS AND REPAIRING DAMAGE TO SOUTHERN FLANK SECURITY. AN IMS OFFICIAL THOUGHT SYG LUNS MIGHT LEND HIS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE TO THIS TASK BY TRAVELING TO ATHENS AND ANKARA. UK OFFICIALS CONFESS THEY HAVE DONE VERY LITTLE THINKING ABOUT HOW TO PICK UP THE

PIECES AND RESTORE NATO UNITY. HMG'S CONCENTRATION IS ONE THE
CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. A GREEK OFFICIAL WAS CONFIDENT
THAT HIS NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A UNITED
INDEPENDENT CYPRUS GOVERNED BY PEOPLE FREELY SELECTED BY THE
CYPRIOTS. A GERMAN THINKS THAT SPECIAL EFFORTS WILL HAVE TO
BE MADE TO REBUILD THE SELF-ESTEEM OF BOTH THE GREEKS AND TURKS.
LONGSTANDING HATRED BETWEEN THEM HAS BEEN INTENSIFIED AND ALLIES
MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACT THAT EVEN A SMALL INCIDENT COULD
CAUSE RENEWED FIGHTING BETWEEN THEM.

5. A CANADIAN FAVORED A STUDY OF LESSONS LEARNED ON HOW THE
ALLIANCE CAN CONTINUE TO FUNCTION WHEN TWO OF ITS MEMBERS
ARE IN CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER. HE TALKED IN TERMS OF AGREEING
ON PROCEDURE TO ISOLATE THE DISPUTANTS FROM INTELLIGENCE
EXCHANGE AND CONSULTATION, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT A REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS IN THE ABSTRACT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE
CERTAIN ALLIES WOULD ASSUME SUCH A STUDY WAS DIRECTLY AIMED AT
THEM. A DANE WONDERED HOW THE DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE WILL
BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO CONDUCT SOME OF ITS BUSINESS. HE SPECU-
LATED ON THE FUTURE OF THE DRC'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENT
OF GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES.

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

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6. OPINIONS ON U.S. PERFORMANCE DURING CRISIS: SEVERAL ALLIES PRAISED THE U.S. ROLE, BUT ADMITTED THEY HAD BEEN SKEPTICAL OF U.S. SILENCE DURING FIRST FEW DAYS. UK REPS VIEWED U.S. POLICY DURING THE CRISIS AS FAIRLY EVENHANDED. THEY WONDERED IF THIS GREECE/TURKEY DUSTOFF WOULD CAUSE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESS TO REDUCE FURTHER THEIR SUPPORT OF NATO. A GERMAN VOLUNTEERED THAT IN HIS OPINION PRESS CRITICISM OF U.S. FOR FAILING TO RESTRAIN THE GREEKS WAS UNFAIR SINCE THERE WAS NOT MUCH THE U.S. COULD HAVE DONE TO FORCE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO REVERSE THE CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD TAKEOVER. A GREEK DIPLOMAT SAID GREEK PUBLIC OPINION WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE REACTION OF "MANY NATO NATIONS" IN THIS CRISIS. SUCH NATIONS
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HE SAID FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT TURKEY WAS THE AGGRESSOR AND GREECE DESIRES ONLY AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS. THIS DIPLOMAT WAS UNABLE, HOWEVER, TO SPECIFY ANYTHING NATO MIGHT HAVE DONE TO AVOID THE CRISIS OR TERMINATE IT MORE SPEEDILY.

7. 20-20 HINDSIGHT: GERMAN INTELLIGENCE FEELS THERE WAS DEFINITELY SOME SORT OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN TURKEY AND USSR PRIOR TO THE INVASION. SEVERAL ALLIES, NOTING THAT TURKISH MILITARY PERFORMANCE WAS ON THE WHOLE RATHER POOR, BELIEVE TURKS WOULD FIGHT MUCH BETTER IF DEFENDING THEIR HOMELAND AGAINST THE SOVIETS. A BRITISH OFFICIAL THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH MANY ATROCITIES PROBABLY OCCURRED, THE TURKISH INVASION APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED WITH CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT, AND ARMOR AND ARTILLERY DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN USED AS INDISCRIMINATELY AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED. ANOTHER BRITISH OFFICIAL THOUGHT THE ALLIANCE ON THE WHOLE HAD DONE RATHER WELL IN THE CRISIS. HE THOUGHT THAT LUNS' PERSONAL MESSAGES AND MESSAGES SENT THROUGH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO TURKISH AND GREEK MILITARY COMMANDS WERE VERY HELPFUL. THIS SAME OFFICIAL THOUGHT THAT US-EC CONSULTATIONS HAD WORKED WELL DURING THE CRISIS. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT BE EUPHORIC ABOUT THIS SINCE IN THIS CASE THERE WAS A BASIC COINCIDENCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN U.S. AND EC.

8. A GREEK OFFICIAL WHO HAD TOLD US THAT A TURKISH INVASION OF CYPRUS WOULD LEAD IN A MATTER OF HOURS TO EITHER THE FALL OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT OR TO WAR BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, ON LEARNING POWER WAS BEING TURNED OVER TO KARAMANLIS, REMAINED US HE HAD TOLD US SO, AND THAT WHILE "A MATTER OF HOURS" WAS PERHAPS EXAGGERATED, ONE OF THOSE TWO ALTERNATIVES WAS INEVITABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. A CANADIAN THOUGHT THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE DID WELL BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HEARD ALLIES "TALK TOUGH" EARLIER IN THE CRISIS TO BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY. HE SAID CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE THROUGH ITS UNFICYP UNIT CAME TO HIM ONLY THROUGH OTTAWA AND IT WAS FOR THE MOST PART RESTRICTED TO TACTICAL MILITARY INFORMATION AND OBSERVATIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PEOPLE ON A MILITARY PERIMETER.

9. AN FRG OFFICIAL FELT THE TURKS HAD HURT NATO BY THEIR POOR

MILITARY SHOWING. HE FELT THEIR BIGGEST MISTAKE WAS EMPLOYING THEIR LANDING FORCES TO ATTACK KYRENIA IN HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHTING INSTEAD OF MERELY SEALING OFF THE CITY AND MOVING FOR LINK-UP WITH PARATROOPERS DROPPED NEAR NICOSIA. HE ADMITTED TURKISH FORCES WERE CONFIDENTIAL

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HAD INCAPPED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT OPERATING WITH THEIR FULL EQUIPMENT AND IN NORMAL ORGANIZATION. AN I.S. OFFICIAL COMMENTED ON DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO KEEP LUNS INFORMED THROUGH HIS PERSONAL STAFF AS THEIR SCREENING ACTION IS SOMETIMES NOT BENEFICIAL. RUMSFELD

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